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Abstract
Background—The Republic of Congo has had no cases of wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) since 
2000. In October 2010, a neurologist noted an abnormal number of cases of acute flaccid paralysis 
(AFP) among adults, which were later confirmed to be caused by WPV1.
Methods—Those presenting with AFP underwent clinical history, physical examination, and 
clinical specimen collection to determine if they had polio. AFP cases were classified as 
laboratory-confirmed, clinical, or nonpolio AFP. Epidemiologic features of the outbreak were 
analyzed.
Results—From 19 September 2010 to 22 January 2011, 445 cases of WPV1 were reported in the 
Republic of Congo; 390 cases were from Pointe Noire. Overall, 331 cases were among adults; 378 
cases were clinically confirmed, and 64 cases were laboratory confirmed. The case-fatality ratio 
(CFR) was 43%. Epidemiologic characteristics differed among polio cases reported in Pointe 
Noire and cases reported in the rest of the Republic of Congo, including age distribution and CFR. 
The outbreak stopped after multiple vaccination rounds with oral poliovirus vaccine, which 
targeted the entire population.
Conclusions—This outbreak underscores the need to maintain high vaccination coverage to 
prevent outbreaks, the need to maintain timely high-quality surveillance to rapidly identify and 
respond to any potential cases before an outbreak escalates, and the need to perform ongoing risk 
assessments of immunity gaps in polio-free countries.
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The Global Polio Eradication Initiative began in 1988 with the goal of interrupting all wild 
poliovirus (WPV) transmission. Progress continues, but poliomyelitis remains endemic in 
Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan [1]. In addition, outbreaks due to importations have 
occurred in countries where indigenous WPV transmission had been interrupted, such as in 
Tajikistan, Ivory Coast, and China in 2010–2011 [2–4]. In some countries that had achieved 
the goal of interrupting WPV transmission, such as Angola, Chad, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), importations have resulted in ongoing, reestablished 
transmission, creating the threat of WPV spread to other polio-free countries.
The Expanded Programme on Immunization began in the Republic of Congo (ROC) in 
1981. However, civil unrest during 1993–2003, including a civil war in 1997–1999, 
disrupted routine immunization services for multiple birth cohorts. The recommended 
routine schedule includes 4 doses of trivalent oral polio vaccine (tOPV) administered at birth 
and at 6, 10, and 14 weeks of age. National reported routine immunization coverage for ≥3 
doses of tOPV3 rose from 42% in 1980 to 90% in 2010; however, tOPV3 coverage dropped 
to 20% during the civil unrest in 1993–2003 (Figure 1) [5]. In 2010, administrative tOPV3 
coverage of 90% was reported among 1-year-olds; however, a survey found tOPV3 
coverage to be 68% [6]. Supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) targeting children 
aged <5 years were conducted starting in 2000, which reduced the number of susceptible 
children born from 1996 to 2006 (Figure 1). With these vaccination efforts, WPV 
transmission was interrupted; the last reported WPV type 1 (WPV1) case prior to 2010 was 
in 2000. However, ROC was at high risk for WPV importation and transmission because of 
low routine tOPV3 coverage among multiple birth cohorts not targeted by SIAs and active 
poliomyelitis outbreaks occurring in the bordering countries of DRC and Angola.
On 9 October 2010, a neurologist in Pointe Noire (PN), ROC, saw a 39-year-old man who 
reported 4 days of fever, headache, myalgias, dysphagia, dyspnea, and constipation, 
followed by acute, flaccid, rapidly progressing, asymmetric bilateral lower extremity 
paralysis. The patient’s vaccination history was unknown. The neurologist initiated 
treatment for suspected Guillain-Barre syndrome but the patient died the following day. 
During the following week, the neurologist noted an unusual number of adults presenting 
with acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) and alerted health officials. On 4 November 2010, WPV1 
most closely genetically related to WPV1 circulating in Angola was isolated from a 
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) specimen obtained from the patient [7], which prompted an 
extensive outbreak response by the ROC Ministry of Health, World Health Organization 
(WHO), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), United Nations Children’s 
Fund, and Médecin Sans Frontières. This report adds to preliminary accounts of the outbreak 
[7–9], providing a more complete description of the epidemiology and control efforts.
METHODS
Case Ascertainment
Surveillance for AFP to detect cases of paralytic poliomyelitis began in 1999 using the 
WHO-recommended poliomyelitis surveillance standard definition for an AFP case: sudden 
onset of flaccid paralysis in a child <15 years of age or suspected poliomyelitis in a person 
of any age [10]. Most persons with AFP during the outbreak were identified through a 
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passive facility-based reporting system, but this was supplemented with active case finding 
by reviewing medical records at health facilities throughout ROC. All reported AFP cases 
were investigated by taking a clinical history from the patient (or their surrogate), 
conducting a physical examination, and collecting 2 stool samples for testing when possible. 
Alternative specimens, including serum, CSF, and rectal, throat, and nasopharyngeal swabs, 
were collected at the outset of the outbreak, before the etiology was established. Vaccination 
status was determined by vaccination card, where available, or by recall. For surviving 
persons from whom 2 adequate stool specimens (ie, collected within 14 days of onset and 
arriving in the laboratory in good condition) were not collected, clinical status was 
reevaluated at least 60 days after onset of paralysis.
Laboratory Testing
Specimens were tested at a WHO-accredited laboratory. WPV was isolated from stool 
specimens in RD and L20B cells in accordance with standard protocols [11] and 
characterized by real-time reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction assays using 
enterovirus-specific and poliovirus group-, sero-type-, and Sabin strain-specific primer sets 
[12]. Testing of nonfecal specimens was conducted using a seminested amplification of viral 
RNA and sequencing of part of the VP1 region directly from clinical specimens as 
previously described [13]. WPV isolates were further characterized by sequencing of the 
complete VP1 coding region [14].
Case Classification
An AFP case was classified as laboratory-confirmed polio if poliovirus was isolated from 
any clinical specimen. Cases with inadequate stool specimens or alternative specimens from 
which WPV1 was not isolated were formally reviewed by the ROC National Polio Expert 
Committee (NPEC) for final classification based on clinical characteristics. An AFP case 
was classified by NPEC as clinically confirmed polio if it occurred in a person (1) with a 
strong likelihood of having poliomyelitis based on clinical presentation, (2) with residual 
paralysis at least 60 days after onset (when follow-up information was available), and (3) 
who lived in a province that had at least 1 laboratory-confirmed case. An AFP case was 
classified as clinically compatible polio if it occurred in a person who had a strong 
likelihood of having poliomyelitis and who lived in a province that did not have any 
laboratory-confirmed cases. For analysis, clinically confirmed or clinically compatible polio 
cases are grouped together and termed “clinical polio cases.” AFP cases classified as 
nonpoliomyelitis AFP were excluded from the outbreak analysis.
Data Management and Analysis
All data were stored in an EpiInfo version 3.5.1 database (CDC, Atlanta, Georgia) and 
analyzed using SAS software, version 9.2 (SAS Institute, Cary, North Carolina). 
Characteristics of the outbreak by case classification and location were evaluated as were the 
demographics, symptoms, and outcomes for cases. Age-group incidence rates were 
calculated. To assess associations between categorical variables, χ2 P values were 
calculated, except in cases where an expected cell count was <5, in which case 2-tailed 
Fisher exact P values were calculated. To assess differences in continuous variables, 
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Wilcoxon rank-sum P values were calculated. The Cochran-Armitage test for trend was used 
to evaluate case-fatality ratios (CFRs) by age strata.
Ethics
As this was an outbreak, institutional review board approval was not needed to conduct this 
public health response.
RESULTS
Epidemiology of the Outbreak
In ROC, 611 AFP cases were reported with onset from 1 January 2010 through 8 May 2011 
(Figure 2). The first polio case had onset of paralysis on 19 September 2010 in PN. From 19 
September 2010 through 22 January 2011, 445 polio cases were reported: 64 laboratory-
confirmed, 378 clinically confirmed, and 3 clinically compatible (Figure 2). Genetically 
related cases were also reported from Gabon, DRC, and the bordering areas of Angola; this 
report focuses on cases in Congo.
The median age among all patients with laboratory-confirmed and clinical polio was 20 
years (range, 0.6–63 years); the age-group incidence per 100 000 was 9 among 0–4-year-
olds, 4 among 5–14-year-olds, 25 among 15–29-year-olds, and 4 among those aged ≥ 30 
years. Among persons with polio, 265 (60%) were born from 1984 to 1995, and 54 (12%) 
were born from 2007 to 2009 (Figure 1). Two adequate stool specimens were collected for 
54 (12%) cases. Vaccination status was missing for 348 (78%) of cases; among the 97 
persons with vaccination history available, 54 (56%) were unvaccinated or undervaccinated 
(Table 1).
Clinical signs and symptoms were similar among patients with laboratory-confirmed and 
clinical polio, except that a greater percentage of those with laboratory-confirmed polio had 
3- or 4-limb paralysis (Table 1). Available data did not permit determination of whether 
bulbar paralysis was present.
Of the 252 polio survivors, 60-day follow-up was completed for 99 (39%); 91 (92%) of 
these had residual paralysis (Figure 3). The overall CFR was 43% (193/445). The CFR 
increased with age: 29% (18/63) among 0–4-year-olds, 36% (16/45) among 5–14-year-olds, 
47% (136/289) among 15–29-year-olds, and 52% (22/42) among persons aged ≥30 years 
(trend test = 0.0024).
Overall, 390 (88%) cases were from PN (Figure 4) and differed epidemiologically from 
those in the rest of ROC (Table 2). In PN, the age-group incidence per 100 000 was 29 
among 0–4-year-olds, 14 among 5–14-year-olds, 112 among 15–29-year-olds, and 17 
among those aged ≥ 30 years. In the rest of ROC, this was 3 among 0–4-year-olds, 1 among 
5–14-year-olds, 2 among 15–29-year-olds, and 0.3 among those aged ≥30 years. The CFR 
was 47% (182/390) among persons with polio reported in PN compared with 20% (11/55) 
among those in the rest of ROC (P = .0001) (Table 2); PN had a higher CFR in all age 
groups but was statistically significant only in the 0–4-year-old group (Figure 5). Persons 
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with polio in PN and in the rest of ROC had similar clinical features including fever, 
asymmetrical paralysis, and 4-limb paralysis (data not shown).
Outbreak Response
A national SIA was conducted 12–22 November 2010 using monovalent OPV against 
WPV1, followed by additional national SIAs in December, January, and February using 
bivalent OPV against WPV1 and WPV3 (bOPV). The first 3 national SIAs were 
synchronized with bordering regions of Angola and DRC. A subregional SIA targeting 7 
districts in southern ROC, including Brazzaville and PN, was conducted in April using 
bOPV and was synchronized with Gabon, Angola, Namibia, and DRC. Because most cases 
were among adults, SIAs targeted the entire population of 4.5 million persons. To reach 
adults, normal SIA vaccination strategies needed to be adapted; in addition to vaccinating by 
visiting each house, vaccinators needed to visit businesses, farms, and restaurants.
DISCUSSION
This explosive poliomyelitis outbreak in ROC, centered in PN and originating from Angola, 
was unusual in its scope. In addition, the incidence of clinical polio was higher among 
young adults than among children, the CFR was much higher than reported in other WPV1 
outbreaks, and the epidemiology of the outbreak varied based on residence. Also, in this 
outbreak, most cases were clinically confirmed rather than laboratory-confirmed, which is 
the global standard. Finally, in response to the right-shifted age distribution, the response 
effort had added challenges beyond those seen in outbreaks among younger age cohorts. A 
national campaign targeting the entire population had to be planned and executed quickly; 
the campaign’s effectiveness is apparent in the deceleration in cases soon after the SIAs 
started. The quick deceleration can be attributed to the fact that the entire population was 
targeted for vaccination, with added contribution from environmental secondary 
immunization through shed Sabin OPV strains.
Children usually comprise a majority of cases in poliomyelitis outbreaks; outbreaks among 
adults are unusual but have been described. In the 1996 WPV1 outbreak in Albania, 96 of 
138 (70%) clinical and laboratory-confirmed cases were among persons aged ≥ 15 years 
[15]. The unusual age distribution in the Albanian outbreak was attributed to multiple 
factors. First, the adults were unlikely to be exposed to WPV1 and thus had little natural 
immunity; second, adults were recommended to receive only 2 doses of vaccine in infancy 
according to the country’s strategy. Finally, mismanagement of cold chain during the years 
that these adults were eligible for vaccination could have resulted in vaccination with 
nonimmunogenic vaccine. In a 2000 poliomyelitis outbreak in Namibia, >90% of 45 cases 
were among persons aged ≥15 years (N. Yusuf, personal written communication, February 
2012); persons with poliomyelitis were suspected of being either unvaccinated or 
incompletely vaccinated due to civil conflict. Furthermore, these age cohorts had not been 
eligible for catch-up SIAs and were not exposed to circulating WPV.
In ROC, poor immunity is the likely reason that this outbreak affected predominantly 15–
29-year-olds (birth years: 1981–1995). This cohort likely had little natural immunity due to 
low exposure to WPV1, as well as suboptimal vaccine-derived immunity due to disrupted 
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routine services in the 1990s and ineligibility for the catch-up SIAs. The SIAs appear to 
have protected cohorts of children born from 1996 to 2006, accounting for the low incidence 
in 5–14-year-olds. The findings of a 2010 vaccine coverage survey conducted in one PN 
neighborhood are consistent with poor immunity in adults; 1-dose tOPV coverage was 87% 
among children aged <5 years, 74% among 5–14-year-olds, 50% among 15–29-year-olds, 
and 34% among adults aged ≥30 years [9]. Although there are limitations with these data in 
that they only cover one neighborhood in PN and much of the vaccination data are based on 
recall, they are consistent with an immunity gap in adults in PN.
Another unusual feature is that the mortality associated with this outbreak is much higher 
than the 5%–10% CFR typically seen in WPV1 outbreaks. Most polio outbreaks primarily 
affect children, and children are less likely to die as a result of WPV1 infection [16, 17]. 
However, even among children aged <15 years in ROC, the CFR was 32%. Furthermore, the 
CFR among those aged ≥15 years was 48%, and while a higher CFR is expected in adults, 
CFRs this high have not been observed in other recent outbreaks in low-income countries. In 
the 2010 WPV1 outbreak in Tajikistan, the CFR was 6% overall, with those aged ≥15 years 
having a CFR of 6% [3]. In a 1996 WPV1 outbreak in Albania, the CFR was 12% overall 
and 14% among adults [15]. An epidemiologic study of risk factors for death is presented 
separately [18].
The epidemiology differed between cases in PN and those from the rest of ROC. The 
outbreak spread broadly throughout the PN region, affecting older age groups. In the rest of 
ROC, fewer cases were reported, with most cases among children. One contributing factor 
could have been the higher population density in PN as well as the slum-like conditions in 
parts of the city, both of which can help to propagate the virus. However, this does not fully 
explain the burden in PN as Brazzaville is approximately 20 times as dense with similar 
slum-like conditions and only reported 13 cases of polio. Furthermore, children with polio in 
PN were more likely to die than those in the rest of ROC. Why the outbreak affected cases 
more severely in PN is unknown, although a variety of reasons were investigated. There 
were no significant genetic differences among the virus strains, including the Angolan 
parental virus, the viruses from different locations within ROC, and the related cases in 
neighboring countries; thus, viral differences were not driving the differential epidemiology. 
There was no evidence of a detection bias in PN with persons having less severe polio 
failing to seek care [19]. No yearly provincial immunization data were available to see if 
there was a larger immunity gap in PN than the rest of ROC.
A limitation of this investigation was that only 39% of survivors had follow-up; thus, the 
NPEC had to rely on presenting clinical data when classifying those without positive 
specimens. Additionally, a high number of cases had to be confirmed clinically due to the 
lack of specimens; adequate stool samples were collected from only 12% of persons with 
polio compared with the global benchmark of 80% [10]. Clinical confirmation is unreliable 
in areas where poliomyelitis is now rare; therefore, laboratory confirmation is the gold 
standard. Laboratory surveillance was challenging in PN, particularly at the peak of the 
outbreak when the 2 main hospitals in PN were caring for >200 paralyzed individuals, 
straining clinical and public health staff. However, because this was a confirmed WPV 
outbreak, the specificity of the definition increases. Because of the increased specificity and 
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the similarities between the laboratory-confirmed and clinical cases, we are confident that 
the vast majority of clinical cases represent true WPV paralysis. A limitation of accepting 
the clinical case definition is that some cases might have been misclassified.
Another limitation of this investigation was surveillance. While country-wide active 
surveillance was conducted, surveillance was facility-based. However, once the outbreak 
was confirmed and vaccination campaigns commenced, media coverage stressed the need to 
visit health facilities, and medical care for polio was free, helping to decrease the impact of 
this surveillance bias. Additionally, surveillance only focused on paralytic polio, and it is 
estimated that for every case of paralytic polio there are 200 more cases that are nonparalytic 
and thus not reported. Finally, we could not obtain more details about the cases, especially 
among the deceased; we are unable to account for bulbar paralysis, living conditions, 
socioeconomic status, and vaccination history.
Several lessons from this outbreak are applicable to other countries. First, ROC had periods 
of civil conflict with low routine vaccination coverage which created age-specific immunity 
gaps. Although these gaps were mitigated to some extent through SIAs, older children were 
not vaccinated, leaving a vulnerable cohort. Health authorities in other polio-free countries, 
especially those with a history of armed conflict or other ruptures of immunization service 
delivery, should carefully evaluate polio immunity level by age cohorts and mitigate the risk 
for an outbreak both among young children and among older cohorts. Second, countries in 
close proximity to countries with active or recent polio circulation are at high risk for 
importation. ROC is adjacent to Angola and DRC, both of which had ongoing, reestablished 
transmission that should have led to the anticipation of an importation. Appropriate 
measures such as increased surveillance and vaccination of nonimmune populations should 
have been taken prophylactically. Third, a high index of suspicion for polio is required in the 
evaluation of all AFP cases, even among adults. Appropriate specimen collection is vital to 
rapidly identifying the first cases of poliomyelitis in previously polio-free countries. Delays 
in processing stool specimens from cases reported during September and October resulted in 
delayed identification of this outbreak until November, causing avoidable delays in response 
activities which prolonged and magnified this outbreak. Fourth, WPV transmission was 
stopped <6 months after onset of the first case with multiple coordinated SIAs targeting the 
entire population. Finally, routine immunization coverage needs to be strengthened 
dramatically in order to mitigate the risk of future importations.
Outbreaks such as the one in the ROC undermine confidence and drain scarce resources. At 
this critical juncture in polio eradication, preventing importations by increasing population 
immunity in vulnerable countries is imperative. Heightened vigilance for WPV importation 
is critical to ending an outbreak quickly.
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Laboratory-confirmed and clinical poliomyelitis cases from the 2010–2011 outbreak and 
coverage with 3 doses of trivalent oral polio vaccine (tOPV3) by birth year, Republic of 
Congo. Data sources: tOPV3 administrative coverage is from the World Health 
Organization Joint Reporting Form [5]; coverage survey data is from the 2005 Demographic 
and Health Survey [20] and 2009 Expanded Program on Immunization Coverage Survey [6]. 
Abbreviations: OPV, oral polio vaccine; SIAs, supplementary immunization activities.
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Classification of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases by the National Poliomyelitis Expert 
Committee (NPEC) plotted by week of onset (n = 611). Arrows indicate start of an oral 
polio vaccine campaign. aNon-polio AFP case: patients with AFP with inadequate clinical 
specimens and who did not have symptoms consistent with poliomyelitis as determined by 
the NPEC. bClinical case: patients with AFP with inadequate clinical specimens with a 
strong likelihood of having poliomyelitis (ie, based on clinical presentation and residual 
paralysis at least 60 days after onset), as determined by the NPEC. This includes all 
clinically confirmed as well as clinically compatible cases. cLaboratory-confirmed WPV1 
case: WPV1 isolated from clinical specimen.
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Clinical status of acute flaccid paralysis cases, including paralysis on 60-day follow-up, loss 
to follow-up, and death, Republic of Congo, 1 January 2010–8 May 2011. Abbreviations: 
AFP, acute flaccid paralysis; ROC, Republic of Congo.
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Laboratory-confirmed and clinical poliomyelitis cases by district of residence, Republic of 
Congo. Dots are placed randomly within a district and are not representative of the exact 
village of a given poliomyelitis case.
Patel et al. Page 13














Case-fatality ratio (CFR) among persons with poliomyelitis reported in Pointe Noire and in 
the rest of the Republic of Congo, stratified by age group, September 2010–January 2011. P 
values provided compare CFR by geographic location within each age group. aCFR χ2 P = .
02. bCFR 2-tailed Fisher exact P = .07. cCFR χ2 P = .51. dCFR 2-tailed Fisher exact P = .60. 
Abbreviations: CFR, case-fatality ratio; ROC, Republic of Congo.
Patel et al. Page 14
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Patel et al. Page 17
Table 2
Comparison of Characteristics of Persons With Poliomyelitis in Pointe Noire Compared With Persons in the 
Rest of the Republic of Congo (2010–2011)
Characteristic Pointe Noire Rest of Republic of Congo χ2 P Value
No. of poliomyelitis cases 390 55
No. of deaths 182 11
Case-fatality ratio 47% 20% .0002
Median age, years (range) 20 (0.6–63) 9 (0.9–54) <.0001a
Male sex 69% 65% .61
2 stool samples collected within 14 days of onset arriving at the laboratory in 
good condition
8% 38% <.0001
Laboratory confirmed 10% 45% <.0001
a
Wilcoxon rank-sum P value.
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